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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4-103(j). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. 
Utah's Governmental Immunity Act immunizes governmental entities from 
lawsuits for damages allegedly caused by a negligent act or omission that "arises out of, 
in connection with, or results from" the activity of "fighting fire." In this case, fire 
hydrants located in residential areas at higher elevations within Washington City were 
without adequate pressure to fight fire. To remedy this problem, the City installed a new 
transmission line and brought that line into service, thereby increasing the water pressure 
to those hydrants, thus protecting the residents at the higher elevations. Plaintiffs allege 
the increased pressure caused damage to their homes. The first issue is whether the trial 
court correctly ruled that the City is immune from suit under the Immunity Act for 
performing a fire fighting activity. 
Standard of Review. "An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal 
conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness." Orvis v. 
Johnson, 2008 UT 2, f 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citation omitted). 
Preservation. This issue was preserved below at R. 391-432, 591-616, 
657-658. 
STG 270639.7 1 
2. 
Alternatively, if the Court determines the trial court erred in holding the City 
immune for the performance of a fire fighting activity, the second question is whether the 
trial court's decision should nonetheless be affirmed under the discretionary function 
doctrine of the Immunity Act. 
Standard of Review. "An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal 
conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness." Orvis v. 
Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ^|6, 177 P.3d 600 (citation omitted). 
Preservation. This alternative ground for affirmance was extensively 
briefed and argued below, and is thus preserved at R. 391-432, 591-616. 
3. 
Finally, the third issue(s) on appeal relates to Intervenors Steven and Allison 
Woods, and both are jurisdictional: 
(a) Whether this Court has jurisdiction over the Woods' appeal of the 
trial court's order denying their motion to intervene, where this Court previously 
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because of the lack of a timely filed notice of 
appeal; and, if so: 
(b) Whether the trial court correctly concluded that the Woods' motion 
to intervene or otherwise join in this case as plaintiffs was barred by their failure to 
timely file a notice of claim as required by the Immunity Act. 
Standard of Review and Preservation on Issue 3(a). "[Q]uestions 
regarding subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time because such issues 
determine whether a court has authority to address the merits of a particular case. 
Further, because it is a threshold issue, [the appellate court must] address jurisdictional 
questions before resolving other claims." Housing Auth. v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28, f 11, 44 
P.3d 724 (citing Thomas v. Lewis, 2001 UT 49,1J13, 26 P.3d 217). Thus, preservation of 
the question of subject matter jurisdiction is "irrelevant." Id. 
Standard of Review and Preservation on Issue 3(b). This issue was 
preserved below at R. 205-215, 321. The trial court's decision concerning compliance 
with the Immunity Act's notice of claim requirements is a conclusion of law that is 
reviewed for correctness. See Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16, TJ9, 40 P.3d 632. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Central to the outcome of this appeal are the following statutes and 
administrative regulations: Utah Code §§ 63-30-10(18)(b) (Supp. 2003) (repealed 
2004); 63-30-10(1); 63-30-11(2) (1997) (repealed 2004); and Utah Admin. Code 
R309-550(5) (2004) (amended 2006), all of which are reproduced at Addendum 1. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
This case arises from Washington City's efforts to remedy the lack of adequate 
water pressure in residential areas located at higher elevations within the City, which 
resulted in inadequate fire flows at hydrants in those areas. To remedy the problem, the 
City designed, engineered, and brought a new water transmission line into service, which 
resulted in an increase in the water pressure to the higher elevations thereby providing 
adequate fire flows to the suspect hydrants. Plaintiffs' homes, which were located in the 
lower elevations of the same subdivision, were allegedly damaged as a result of the 
increase. 
Plaintiffs sued the City in the Fifth District Court alleging that the City violated 
their federal constitutional and civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as certain state 
constitutional rights. [R. 1.] Plaintiffs also alleged various tort claims. [R. 1.] The City 
removed the case to federal court and successfully obtained a dismissal of Plaintiffs' 
federal claims on a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). [R. 130-137; 95-96.] The state 
claims were then remanded back to state court, where the City obtained summary 
judgment on Plaintiffs' state constitutional claims. [R. 306-311.] 
Around this time, Steven and Allison Woods sought to intervene or otherwise join 
in the suit as plaintiffs. [R. 172-76.] The trial court denied their motion as untimely 
because they did not file a notice of claim as required by the Immunity Act. [R. 321.] 
The Woods thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied. [R. 
345.] The Woods appealed. [R. 347.] This Court dismissed the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction because the Woods' notice of appeal was not filed within thirty days of the 
trial court's final order. See Woods v. Washington City, 2007 UT App 398, No. 
20070779-CA (Utah Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2007) (per curiam).1 
The suit went forward between Plaintiffs and the City and, after performing 
discovery, the City moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' remaining claims. [R. 
391-465.] The trial court granted the City's motion [R. 657-58] and entered final 
judgment in the City's favor on February 8, 2009. [R. 680.] Plaintiffs now appeal. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
A. Background: The Impact of Growth on Washington City's 
Water System 
Washington City (the "City") is a Utah municipal corporation with approximately 
16,000 residents. [R. 396.] It is the second largest city in Washington County. [R. 396.] 
The City's population has more than tripled since 1990, when it had a population of 
approximately 4,000 residents. [R. 396.] As the City has grown, so has the demand on 
its essential services, particularly water. [R. 397.] This demand for water and supporting 
infrastructure has been the subject of ongoing discussion by, and concern to, the 
Washington City Council and other City officials. [R. 397.] 
1
 A copy of this Court's order is attached at Addendum 4. 
2
 The facts under Sections A-D are the undisputed facts before the trial court on 
summary judgment. 
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The City plans its water system around a comprehensive culinary water master 
plan, which is generally a twenty year picture for growth. [R. 397.] The City reviews the 
plan on an ongoing basis, typically every five years; however, the recent growth of the 
City, accompanied by the increased demand for water, has required the City to review the 
plan more frequently, every two to three years. [R. 397.] 
The City's water system is a gravity fed system, in which water is pumped from 
wells up to storage tanks that are located at higher elevations in the City, and then from 
the tanks the water is distributed (i.e., gravity fed) into the City's distribution system. [R. 
397.] The City's culinary water system is also used to provide fire protection within the 
City. [R. 397.] At all times relevant to this action, the demand for water has been an 
issue in developments located at higher elevations in the City, including the Majestic 
View subdivision. [R. 398.] 
The City's primary concern with regard to these subdivisions has been the ability 
to provide sufficient water pressure for fire protection purposes. [R. 398.] Specifically, 
the City was required to supply at least 20 pounds of pressure per square inch ("psi") to 
the meter for fire flow purposes. [R. 398.] This requirement is established by state 
regulation governing "fire protection." See Utah Admin. Code R309-550(5)(e) (2004) 
(amended 2006) (requiring "a minimum pressure of 20 psi is maintained at all times and 
at all points in the distribution system"). 
3
 The reference "to the meter" is a generally accepted reference that describes the 
point where a city's obligations end and the property owner's obligations begin, usually 
at the street curb or property line. [R. 400.] 
During the relevant time period, the higher elevations of the Majestic View 
subdivision did not have sufficient water pressure for fire protection purposes, failing to 
meet the 20 psi requirement. [R. 398.] At times there was 10-16 psi at the higher 
elevations in Majestic View, and at other times the City simply could not get any water 
from the fire hydrants at those elevations. [R. 398.] Indeed, Plaintiffs' own expert 
witness, John Daniel Thorpe, a former City employee, testified with respect to a hydrant 
in Majestic View subdivision: "You could come up here and stand right here and open 
that fire hydrant up and anywhere from 7:00 to 9:00 in the morning and you'd suck air." 
[R. 465 at Ex. G Thorpe Dep. 85:16-194; R. 595-596.] 
To remedy the situation, the City—the City Council in consultation with City 
officials and engineers—discussed, considered, and debated both permanent and 
temporary solutions related to present needs, projected growth, and costs. [R. 398-99.] 
This discussion and consideration included construction of new pipelines and other 
infrastructure, as well as building a new water tank, a solution the City determined would 
help address the water pressure and fire protection issues. [R. 399.] The City's engineers 
were central to these discussions and were responsible for updating the water master plan 
for consideration of the City Council. [R. 399.] The City's consideration of these 
proposed solutions included evaluating the costs associated with each scenario, along 
4
 The exhibits supporting the City's summary judgment motion are in the record 
beginning at R. 464. The exhibits themselves, however, were not separately paginated by 
the Clerk. As such, in citing to those exhibits without a record number, we cite to R. 464-
465, which is the City's "Exhibits Supporting Defendant's Motions for Summary 
Judgment," and then the exhibit by number as assigned by the City in the summary 
judgment briefing. 
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with proposals and discussion on how to pay for the solutions, including use of impact 
fees, bonds, and taking on debt. [R. 399.] 
Ultimately, the City made the decision to engineer, construct, install, and finally to 
bring into a service a new distribution/transmission line (the "Southern Transmission" 
line) to ensure sufficient fire flows and fire protection to the higher elevations in Majestic 
View, flows that would satisfy regulations and protect the City's residents. [R. 399.] 
Prior to bringing the Southern Transmission line into service, the City performed or had 
performed certain testing, including pressure tests, flushing the lines, and performing 
bacteria tests. [R. 399.] The Southern Transmission line was brought into service in 
August 2003. [R.399.] 
B. Pressure Reducing Valves and Water Pressure in the City 
Because of the different and drastic changes in elevation within the City, and the 
fact that the water system is gravity fed, there is no standard or "normal" operating water 
pressure within the City. [R. 400.] As a general rule, every foot of elevation change 
results in a .44 pound change in the water pressure (gained going downhill or lost going 
uphill). [R.400.] 
Thus, when asked in his deposition about what amount of water pressure a 
residence can typically handle, the City's public works director, Mike Shaw, could not 
answer the question. He testified: "There's too many variables." [R.400.] Instead, the 
City determined that its obligation was to provide a minimum of 20 psi at every meter as 
directed by state law and as necessary for adequate fire protection. [R. 400.] 
The City's responsibility was to supply water to the meter, and from there, the 
responsibility lies with the property owner, who is entitled to reduce or increase the 
pressure to an acceptable level to the owner as it comes onto the owner's property and 
into the owner's home. [R. 400.] In other words, as a general rule, the City's 
responsibility ends at the curb. [R. 400.] Therefore, as far as regulating pressure coming 
onto a homeowner's property and then into the home, the responsibility lies with the 
homeowner. [R. 400.]5 
The method to regulate water pressure is through the use of a pressure reducing 
valve ("PRV"). [R. 401.] Where the water pressure coming into a home exceeds 80 psi, 
the applicable plumbing code requires installation of a PRV. [R. 401.] The 
responsibility for installing the PRV is the homeowner's—or, as is usually the case, the 
builder of the home. [R. 401.] There are different types and manufacturers of PRVs and 
a wide range of ratings for PRVs that ultimately determine how much water pressure a 
PRV can handle. [R.40L] 
Prior to the City bringing the Southern Transmission line into service, water 
pressure into the homes in the lower portion of Majestic View—at issue in this 
litigation—had at least 80 psi and were therefore required to have PRVs installed. [R. 
401.] 
5
 For the Court's reference, the diagram attached to the deposition exhibits of 
Wilkinson, East, and Thorpe illustrate the flow of water from the City's distribution 
system to the meter, and then to a residence. [R. 464-465 at Exs. E, F & G.] 
QTO iir\cia n 
According to the City—including its public works director, engineer, and its 
project manager—the maximum water pressure capable of being transmitted through the 
Southern Transmission line is 161 psi, and that is at the lowest point (in terms of 
elevation) in the line. [R. 401.] The City cannot reduce the pressure in the Southern 
Transmission line because it would adversely affect those in the higher elevations, 
thereby defeating the purpose of the line. [R. 402.] 
C. The Damage to Plaintiffs' Homes 
Plaintiffs Paul and Donna Wilkinson lived in the Majestic View subdivision. [R. 
402.] Elevation wise, the Wilkinson home was located on the lower end of subdivision. 
[R. 402.] The Wilkinson home had two PRVs: one installed on the line as it comes into 
the home at the hot water heater and one on the house side of the City's meter. [R. 402.] 
The Wilkinson's PRVs were capable of handling water pressure of up to 300 psi and 400 
psi, respectively. [R. 403.] 
Plaintiffs Eldon and Sherene East also lived at the lower end of the Majestic View 
subdivision. [R. 403.] At all relevant times, the Easts had no PRV installed on their side 
of the meter, to regulate pressure coming into the East home from the City's line. [R. 
404.] However, the Easts did have a PRV installed in the heater room of their home, 
which was capable of withstanding pressure of up to 300 psi. [R. 404.]6 
6
 In their brief, Plaintiffs claim that their PRVs were only capable of handling 
sustained pressure in excess of 25-80 psi. See Plf. Br. at 10. There is no evidence to 
support this assertion and none was presented to the trial court below. Rather, in 
discovery, the City obtained the model numbers of the PRVs, and the psi that each could 
withstand, all of which went undisputed on summary judgment. [R. 402-403 (Wilkinson 
On the morning of August 6, 2003, Wilkinson discovered water flowing out from 
under the door of his shop, which is detached from his home. [R. 404.] A few days later, 
the water treatment system in the East home "blew out." [R. 405.] Pressure tests 
performed at various parts of the Wilkinson home received readings from as high as 162 
psi to as low as 142 psi. [R. 405.] The East home was pressure tested at 160 psi. [R. 
405.] Wilkinson and East then went to neighbors and pressure tested about seven 
different homes. [R. 405.] These homes were approximately the same elevation as the 
Wilkinson and East homes on the lower end of Majestic View. [R. 405.] Excluding their 
own homes, the highest reading the two obtained was 162 psi. [R. 405.] The lowest was 
150 psi. [R. 405.] East testified that his pressure test gauge is accurate within plus or 
minus three or four pounds. [R. 405.] 
D. Plaintiffs9 Claims and the Litigation 
On November 13, 2003, Wilkinson and East filed a notice of claim with the City. 
[R. 214-215.] Several months later, in March 2004, they filed suit in Fifth District Court 
in Washington County alleging a laundry list of federal constitutional and civil rights 
violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as certain state constitutional and tort claims. 
[R. 1-18.] The City removed the case to the United States District Court. [R. 46-49.] It 
then moved for partial judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiffs' federal claims under 
home had installed a Watts model no. 25AUB-Z3, which was capable of withstanding 
water pressure of up to 300 psi and a Watts model no. N45B-M1, which was capable of 
withstanding water pressure of up to 400 psi)]; [R. 404 (East home had a Watts model 25 
AUB located in their heater room capable of withstanding pressure of up to 300 psi)]. 
Plaintiffs cannot change these facts for convenience on appeal. See infra at 19-24. 
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). [R. 149-163.] U.S. District Judge Tena Campbell 
granted the City's motion and dismissed Plaintiffs' federal claims, calling them "garden 
variety" tort claims that do not implicate § 1983. [R. 132 Tr. 3:2-6; R. 165-166, 95-96.] 
The case was then remanded back to the Fifth District Court. [R. 94-96.] 
The City then moved for partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs' state 
constitutional claims, asserting that, even if Plaintiffs' allegations are taken as true, they 
do not give rise to claims for damages under the Utah Constitution. [R. 105-106, 111.] 
The trial court agreed and granted the City's motion, thereby dismissing Plaintiffs' state 
constitutional claims. [R. 306-311.] 
After conducting discovery, which included deposing both Plaintiffs and their 
expert witness, John Daniel Thorpe, the City filed two concurrent motions for summary 
judgment on Plaintiffs' remaining claims: the first addressing Plaintiffs' lack of 
causation [R. 434-462] and the second asserting the City's governmental immunity 
(under either fire fighting or discretionary function immunity) [R. 391-432]. 
After hearing oral argument on the motions [R. 686], the trial court granted the 
City's motion on immunity grounds, reasoning that "it is undisputed that the City's 
reason for increasing the water pressure in the Majestic View subdivision was for the 
The City's causation argument centered on Plaintiffs' failure to present any non-
speculative evidence on the issue of causation [R. 455-462], which is grounds for 
summary judgment see Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360, 1367-68 (Utah 1986) 
(affirming summitry judgment for city where plaintiffs evidence of proximate cause 
required inferences based on "sheer speculation"). The trial court did not comment on 
this issue, choosing instead to decide the case on immunity grounds. However, as argued 
below, though it asserts governmental immunity, the City does not concede negligence in 
this matter. 
purpose of providing sufficient fire flow at fire hydrants for fire protection purposes. 
This action constitutes a fire fighting activity and therefore the City is immune from suit 
under section 63-30-10(18)(b) of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act." [R. 657-658.] 
In addition, on motion from the City [R. 552], the trial court struck the only affidavit 
Plaintiffs submitted in opposition to summary judgment—the Thorpe affidavit—on the 
grounds that it "is insufficient under Rule 56(e) standards and otherwise contradicts Mr. 
Thorpe's prior sworn deposition testimony." [R. 658.] 
Final judgment was entered for the City on February 18, 2009. [R. 680.] 
E, The Woods9 Attempt to Intervene and Previous Appeal 
Steven and Allison Woods also resided in the Majestic View subdivision. [R. 
172-176.] In July 2006, the Woods sought to intervene in this action by filing a motion 
titled "Motion for Joinder of Parties," in which they asserted that they had also been 
injuredby the City's increase in the water pressure. [R. 172-176.] The City opposed the 
motion arguing that the Woods failed to timely file a notice of claim as required by the 
Immunity Act, which barred them from suing the City. [R. 205-215.] The trial court 
agreed and on August 6, 2007 denied the Woods' motion as "untimely." [R. 321.] 
In response to the trial court's order, the Woods filed a motion styled as a "Motion 
for Reconsideration." [R. 330.] In the motion, the Woods simply asked the trial court to 
rethink its decision on timeliness. [R. 332-334.] On September 5, 2007, the trial court 
denied the Woods' motion to reconsider. [R. 345.] On September 21, 2007, more than 
forty-five days after the trial court entered its initial order denying their "Motion for 
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Joinder of Parties," the Woods filed a notice of appeal, seeking to appeal both the trial 
court's initial denial of their motion to join and its denial of their "Motion for 
Reconsideration." [R. 347.] 
The Woods then filed a motion for certification of the trial court's denial of their 
motion for reconsideration as final. [R. 352.] In that motion, the Woods referred to 
themselves as "Plaintiffs in Intervention," and indicated that the motion for "joinder" was 
in actuality a motion to "intervene" as plaintiffs. [R. 352-53.] The trial court never acted 
upon this motion for certification, and the Woods never filed a request to submit with 
respect to the motion. [R. passim.} But having already filed a notice of appeal, the 
Woods went ahead and filed a docketing statement with this Court. See Docketing 
Statement, Woods v. Washington City, No. 20070779-CA. The City then immediately 
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that there was not a final 
appealable order. See City's Mo. Dismiss, Woods v. Washington City, No. 20070779-
CA. 
The Woods responded by citing Tracy v. University of Utah Hospital 619 P.2d 
340, 342 (Utah 1980), wherein the court held that an order denying a motion to intervene 
is final and immediately appealable, and thus argued that the denial of their motion to 
intervene was a final appealable order. See Mem. Opp. Mo. Dismiss at 1-2, Woods v. 
Washington City, No. 20070779-CA. This Court accepted the Woods' argument and 
denied the City's motion to dismiss. See Woods v. Washington City, No. 20070779-CA 
(Utah Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2007). However, the Court also stated that: "[a]fter review of 
the record and the filings in this appeal, another jurisdictional issue has arisen. This 
appeal is being considered for summary disposition on the basis that this court lacks 
jurisdiction due to an untimely filed notice of appeal." Id The Court then ordered the 
parties to file memoranda addressing the issue. See id. 
After receiving the parties' memoranda, this Court determined that the Woods 
failed to timely file their notice of appeal and dismissed the same for lack of jurisdiction. 
See Woods v. Washington City, 2007 UT App 398, No. 20070779-CA (Utah Ct. App. 
Dec. 20, 2007) (per curiam). Undeterred, the Woods are back to appeal the same order. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. When the alarm bell sounds and a municipal fire department races to the 
scene of a fire, intent on saving lives and property, its efforts will be for naught if the fire 
fighters arrive and attach their hoses to the nearest hydrants only to find out there is no 
water. That was the situation facing Washington City. Rather than sitting on its hands, 
the City was proactive and addressed the situation. It designed, engineered, and 
ultimately brought a new transmission line into service thereby increasing the water 
pressure into the higher elevations and supplying suspect hydrants with sufficient fire 
flow to enable the City to fight a fire. 
Plaintiffs claim that the City's decisions and actions damaged their homes, which 
sit in the lower elevations of the subdivision at issue. The Utah Governmental Immunity 
o 
Attached at Addendum 3. 
Act immunizes the City from suit for damages caused by a negligent act or omission that 
"arises out of, in connection with, or results from" the activity of "fighting fire." Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-3 0-10( 18)(b). The Legislature, in using the terminology "fighting fire," 
did not define its outer limits, but the clear import of the phrase expands its application 
beyond first responder situations because the Legislature qualified its use of "fighting 
fire" with the enlarging term "activities." See id. Certainly, the Legislature did not 
intend that the activity of fighting fire would not include ensuring an adequate flow of 
water to hydrants. Rather, as numerous other jurisdictions have recognized, fighting fire 
is more than holding a hose or wielding an axe at the scene of an inferno; it includes 
ensuring that hydrants have sufficient water to make it possible to fight fire. 
Here, the trial court correctly concluded that the City's actions constituted a fire 
fighting activity under section 63-30-10(18)(b). Any other interpretation would lead to a 
result that provides immunity to governmental entities when committing a negligent act 
on the scene of the outbreak of a fire, but hold them liable for a negligent act while 
engaged in activities that actually enable them to fight fire in the event of an outbreak. 
The policy behind the Immunity Act is recognition of the fact that when government 
undertakes an activity to ensure the public health and safety, its performance of those 
activities should not be influenced or affected by fear of potential liability should it 
perform inadequately or in a manner unacceptable to certain members of the public. See 
DeBrv v.Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 441 (Utah 1995). 
A ruling against the City on this issue would run counter to this policy and the 
intent of the Immunity Act. It would provide no incentive for government to act to 
prevent or better equip themselves to fight fire. Taken to its logical conclusion, if the 
Court does not interpret subsection (18)(b) to shield the City from liability under the facts 
of this case, it has effectively ruled that the City should have done nothing, and waited 
instead to find its immunity on the scene of an inferno as water trickles from the hose 
while property is engulfed in flames and lives are in danger. That cannot be the law. The 
trial court should be affirmed. 
2. In the event the Court disagrees with the trial court's interpretation of 
subsection (18)(b), it should affirm on alternative grounds under discretionary function 
immunity. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-10-10(1). In this case, the City was faced with a 
situation in which the lives and property of many of its citizens were at risk because of 
the lack of water in hydrants at higher elevations within the City. In response to this 
situation, the City, through its City Council and with input from City officials and 
engineers, discussed and debated temporary and long term alternatives and solutions to 
the problem; present need and future growth; costs of different proposals and how to pay 
for them; and how any expansion of the water system to address the problem would 
impact on its long term culinary water master plan. Ultimately, the City settled on the 
addition of the Southern Transmission line to its water system. 
Because the City engaged in exactly the type of department wide consideration, 
evaluation, and weighing of policies that entitle a municipality to discretionary function 
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immunity, the City's decision in this case should be immunized by the discretionary 
function doctrine. In short, the City's underlying decisions in this case were integral to 
the exercise of the discretion afforded to the City and its officials and these decisions 
must be protected. Otherwise, we are left with the inexplicable situation in which City 
officials would have the discretion to run the water system, the duty to provide fire 
protection and water supply to its citizens, but no discretion to determine how to do so 
effectively and efficiently. 
3. Finally, as it relates to the appeal of the proposed intervenors, Steven and 
Allison Woods, this Court has two independent grounds to affirm the trial court. First, 
this Court has previously dismissed the Woods' appeal of the very issue they appeal now, 
determining that it was without jurisdiction because the Woods failed to timely file a 
notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final order appealed from. The 
passage of time has not made their appeal timely. Rather, as before, this Court should 
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 
P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating "[w]hen a matter is outside the court's 
jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss the action"). 
Second, should this Court decline to rely on its previous decision, the trial court 
should be affirmed on the merits because the Woods never filed notice of claim with the 
City as required by the Immunity Act. Failure to file a notice of claim "deprives a court 
of subject matter jurisdiction and precludes a claimant from bringing suit against a 
governmental entity." Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109,1[20, 37 P.3d 1156. 
As a result, the trial court correctly denied the Woods' motion to intervene as plaintiffs in 
this case because they are barred from suing the City. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD IGNORE PLAINTIFFS' ATTEMPTS TO RE-
INVENT THE FACTS. 
A. On Appeal from Summary Judgment, the Appellate Court is Confined 
to the Facts that were Properly Before the Trial Court in the Summary 
Judgment Briefing. 
On appeal from summary judgment, the appellate court is confined to the 
summary judgment record, and the facts properly before the trial court in the summary 
judgment briefing. See Heideman v. Washington City, 2007 UT App 11, }^16, 155 P.3d 
900 (on appeal from summary judgment, the appellate court is "confined to the disputed 
facts that were properly before the trial court"); Granite Credit Union v. Remick, 2006 
UT App 115, IflO n.4, 133 P.3d 440 (in reviewing an order granting summary judgment 
the appellate court relies "solely on those facts properly before the trial court"). 
In their brief, Plaintiffs flat ignore these rules and instead pick through the entire 
three volume trial record in an effort to piece together a set of facts that appear to support 
their version of events. In some instances, Plaintiffs simply invent facts by inserting 
stricken evidence or citing arguments of counsel as if the arguments were facts and 
evidence. This begins with Plaintiffs' statement of the case and spills over into their legal 
arguments. 
For example, in their fact statement, Plaintiffs cite various affidavits, including 
their own affidavits and the affidavit of their expert, John Daniel Thorpe. See Plf. Br. at 
13-16. The Thorpe affidavit, on which Plaintiffs rely heavily to support their facts and 
legal arguments, was stricken by the trial court because it did not adhere to Rule 56(e) 
standards and otherwise contradicted Thorpe's deposition testimony. [R. 658]; see also 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); Brinton v. IHC Hospitals. Inc., 973 P.2d 9565 973 (Utah 1998) 
(holding that an affiant may not raise an issu J of fact by his own affidavit which 
contradicts his prior sworn deposition). Plaintiffs do not appeal that ruling. Instead, they 
offer a footnote in which they explain that they cited the affidavit because it is a "material 
piece of evidence." Plf Br. at 13-14 n.l. Plaintiffs' opinion on what is material is 
irrelevant. 
When a trial court strikes an affidavit and the ruling is unchallenged on appeal, the 
appealing party may not rely on or cite to that affidavit in an effort to support its 
arguments. See Heideman, 2007 UT App 11 at [^10 n.7 (refusing to consider citations to 
stricken affidavit on appeal from summary judgment where appealing party failed to 
appeal ruling striking affidavit). Thus, because Plaintiffs have not appealed the trial 
court's ruling striking the Thorpe affidavit, they have waived and abandoned the claim, 
see Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), 
and cannot revive it in their reply brief, see Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assoc, 910 P.2d 
1252, 1260 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). As a result, this Court should disregard any reference 
to the Thorpe affidavit and reject any of Plaintiffs' arguments that are based on those 
references. 
Similarly, Plaintiffs' own affidavits were not even before the trial court on 
summary judgment. Plaintiffs never referenced or cited these affidavits in their 
memorandum opposing summary judgment. [R. 476-515.] An appealing party may not 
sandbag a trial court or the prevailing party by using evidence on appeal that was never 
presented in opposition to summary judgment in the first instance. See Jennings Inv., LC 
v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119, f26, 208 P.2d 1077 (stating that "[a] 
district court is not obliged to comb the record to determine whether a genuine issue as to 
any material fact exists to prevent summary judgment. Rather, it is the nonmoving 
party's burden to demonstrate that such a conflict exists").9 
Another flaw in Plaintiffs' fact statement is that they cite to arguments of counsel, 
either at the summary judgment hearing or in the briefing, and attempt to pass the 
arguments off as fact. See Plf. Br. at 13-14 ffl[3, 4, 6, 7. This is largely in reference to 
alleged testimony given by the City's former fire chief, Dwayne Isom, in another case. 
However, if a non-moving party desires to set forth "additional facts," i.e., its own 
version of the facts for purposes of summary judgment, it must support those facts by 
citation to materials as required by Rules 7 and 56. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B) 
(requiring "any additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be 
9
 Plaintiffs actually submitted their affidavits two years prior to the summary 
judgment motion at issue in this appeal, as part of Plaintiffs' opposition to the City's 
earlier motion for summary judgment on the constitutional claims. [R. 191-200.] The 
City objected to the affidavits as inadmissible and insufficient under Rule 56(e) 
standards. [R. 216-221.] Ultimately, the trial court agreed with those objections because 
it granted partial summary judgment to the City, ignoring the facts and claims made in 
Plaintiffs' affidavits. [R. 306-309.] That ruling is not challenged on appeal. 
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separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to supporting materials, such as 
affidavits or discovery materials"). 
Here, any alleged testimony given by Isom was not before the trial court and 
cannot be substantiated by the record. Indeed, Plaintiffs attempted this same thing before 
the trial court with respect to the alleged Isom testimony, when their counsel argued that 
the alleged testimony given in another case should preclude summary judgment in this 
case. [R. 686 Tr. 14-15.] The trial court, recognizing that this was nothing more than 
argument for which no admissible evidence had been offered, responded: "Counsel, my 
concern about that is the record in this case is not the record in the other one. And 
judicial notice will only go so far." [R. 686 Tr. 15:14-16.] Ignoring this, Plaintiffs 
pepper their brief with the arguments anyway, pretending as if they can make up the 
evidence and supplement the record on the fly. See Plf. Br. at 13-14, 21 (references to a 
prior case and to testimony allegedly given by Dwayne Isom). 
But the trial court was correct. Although a court "must view all facts and 
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party" on summary judgment, "it 
may not assume facts for which no evidence is offered." Mountain West Surgical Center, 
L.L.C. v. Hospital Corp. of Utah, 2007 UT 91, TflO, 173 P.3d 1276. Arguments and 
statements of counsel are not evidence. See Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling, 968 
F.2d 1022, 1025 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that arguments and statements of counsel "are 
not summary judgment evidence"); Betances v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 248 F.3d 40 (1st 
Cir. 2001) (stating "[b]ombast and bluster, wholly detached from verified facts of record, 
cannot serve to blunt the force of a movant's statement of undisputed facts"). 
Finally, Plaintiffs cannot utilize the trial court's partial summary judgment ruling 
on their constitutional claims to invent a fact dispute for appeal. This is so for at least 
three reasons. First, there was no "finding of fact" in a "prior ruling" as Plaintiffs 
suggest. That ruling was a grant of partial summary judgment to the City on Plaintiffs' 
state constitutional claims. [R. 306-311.] A trial court does not make "findings of fact" 
on summary judgment. See Hill v. Grand Cent., Inc., 477 P.2d 150, 151 (Utah 1970) 
(stating "[sjummary judgment is never used to determine what the facts are"). 
Second, the trial court was explicit in its earlier ruling that the undisputed facts for 
purposes of its order were "undisputed and considered in the light most favorable to the 
Plaintiffs for purposes of this summary judgment motion only." [R. 307 atn.l (Emphasis 
added).] In so stating, the trial court followed correct summary judgment procedure, and 
if the facts were presented differently after discovery had occurred, the trial court was 
free to view them in a different light and reach a different conclusion. See Barnes v. 
Clarkson, 2008 UT App 44,1fl6 n.5, 178 P.3d 930, cert, denied, 199 P.3d 367 (Utah 
2008). See also Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A) (providing that "[e]ach fact set forth in the 
moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary 
judgment") (emphasis added). But Plaintiffs failed to do anything and their attempts to 
re-characterize the facts for purposes of the ruling they do appeal should be rejected. 
Third, and along those same lines, Plaintiffs do not appeal the trial court's order 
granting partial summary judgment to the City on the state constitutional claims. Any 
challenge to that ruling is therefore waived. See Pixton, 809 P.2d at 751. Nor did 
Plaintiffs ever take it up with the trial court after it was entered or claim that it somehow 
precluded the entry of summary judgment on immunity grounds. [R. passim.] Indeed, 
Plaintiffs never once argued to the trial court that there was any dispute or inconsistencies 
between the decisions. [R. 476-515.] Having failed to bring the matter to the trial court's 
attention or raise it in any matter to avoid summary judgment, Plaintiffs have failed to 
preserve it as a basis for reversal. See Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 
2002 UT 48,1[14, 48 P.3d 968 (holding that "in order to preserve an issue for appeal the 
issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an 
opportunity to rule on that issue"). 
In sum, Plaintiffs' brief does not present an accurate picture of the facts and 
evidence before the trial court below. This Court should therefore reject Plaintiffs' 
attempts to re-invent the record and disregard their presentation of the facts and any legal 
argument that is dependent on those facts. See, e.g., Utah R. App. P. 24(j) (requiring all 
briefs be presented with accuracy). 
B. Plaintiffs Failed to Create any Disputed Issue of Material Fact that 
Would Preclude Summary Judgment. 
Of course, Plaintiffs' effort to provide new facts and evidence on appeal centers on 
their desire to create a disputed issue of material fact concerning the City's reason for 
increasing the water pressure. What Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate is that they 
actually disputed the facts below as required by Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. As the Utah Supreme Court explained, to dispute a statement on summary 
judgment, the opposing party must cite to admissible evidence that directly contradicts 
the statement, thereby putting it at issue. See Johnson v. Hermes Assocs., Ltd., 2005 UT 
82, |24, 128 P.3d 1151. "Absent a direct counter[,]" the movant's statement is 
undisputed. Id See also Jennings Inv., 2009 UT App 119 at }^26 (refusing to find a 
disputed issue of fact where "statement does nothing to dispute [movant's] claimed 
facts"). Against this standard, the trial court appropriately determined there was no 
disputed issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment. 
Specifically, in its summary judgment memorandum (at ^|16), the City asserted 
that it was undisputed that: 
TJ16: Ultimately, the City made the decision to engineer, construct, and finally to 
bring into a service a new distribution/transmission line (the "Southern 
Transmission" line) for the purpose of providing sufficient fire flows and 
fire protection to the higher elevations in Majestic View. (Shaw Dep. 20:1-
20, 27:24-25, 28:1-6; Wilson Dep. 44:16-25, 45, 46:1-21.) 
[R. 399.] In support of this statement, the City cited to the deposition testimony of its 
public works director and its engineer. [R. 399; 464 Ex. B & C] 
Plaintiffs attempted to dispute the statement as follows: 
Deny. The Southern Transmission line was brought into service to furnish 
subdivisions, such as Majestic View, with water. (Thorpe Depo. 86-87) 
[R. 481.] In support, they cited to the Thorpe deposition transcript. [R. 481.] However, 
as we explained to the trial court, Plaintiffs' citation to the Thorpe deposition did not 
directly counter the City's statement; rather, Thorpe's deposition testimony confirmed the 
statement. [R. 596-598.] An examination of the cited portions of Thorpe's testimony 
shows that he agrees that the Southern Transmission line was brought into service to 
furnish the Majestic View subdivision with water for fire protection, i.e., water to 



















Okay. Is it your understanding that the reason the city brought the 
southern transmission line on -
This line was to service back and forth through here for the new 
subdivisions. 
A n d -
They just - they stopped it right here at the top. 
And to bring pressure to those higher elevations. 
Right. And that was to furnish this subdivision and stuff with water. 
Because you couldn't get no water up here. 
Couldn't get water out of the hydrants? 
Right. 





Were those ever tested? 
Yeah, they're the same pressure. 
So at that time there was inadequate -
Fire flow. 
—fire flow out of those. 
Uh-huh. During a certain period of time. 
[R. 596-597; See also R. 465 Ex. G Thorpe Dep. 86:19-25, 87, 88:1-3 (Emphasis added).] 
Thus, contrary to Plaintiffs' assertions, Thorpe's deposition testimony did not directly 
counter the City's statement; it confirmed it. In light of this, Plaintiffs have offered only 
a generic denial. But "[a] generic denial is inadequate." Johnson v. Hermes Assocs., 
Ltd.,2005UT82atTJ21. 
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding there were no disputed issues 
of material fact concerning the reason the City brought the Southern Transmission line 
into service and increased the water pressure—to provide adequate pressure in fire 
hydrants in residential areas located in higher elevations. Having failed to create any 
dispute below, Plaintiffs cannot now claim there are disputed issues of material fact that 
warrant reversal. Rather, Plaintiffs were assured that their "[fjailure to produce 
acceptable evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact [would] result in a 
grant of summary judgment" in favor of the City. Stevens v. LaVerkin City, 2008 UT 
App 129,1[18, 183 P.3d 1059 (citation omitted). 
II. ENSURING THAT HYDRANTS HAVE SUFFICIENT WATER PRESSURE 
TO FIGHT FIRE IS NECESSARILY A "FIRE FIGHTING" ACTIVITY. 
There is a three part test to determine whether a governmental entity is immune 
from suit: "(1) the activity giving rise to the plaintiffs claim served a governmental 
function; (2) governmental immunity is not waived for the particular activity; or (3) if 
immunity is waived for a particular activity, the activity falls under an applicable 
exception to that waiver." Grappendorf v. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT 84, ^|6, 173 
P.3d 166. The first two elements have not been contested in this litigation or on appeal. 
As such, the focus is on the third element: whether the City's conduct falls within an 
exception to the general waiver of immunity. 
As a governmental entity, the City is immune from suit for damages caused by a 
negligent act or omission that "arises out of, in connection with, or results from" the 
activity of "fighting fire." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(18)(b) (Supp. 2003) (repealed 
2004). It is undisputed that the City increased the water pressure to ensure the 
availability of water in hydrants in the higher elevations in the Majestic View 
subdivision. As set forth below, the trial court was correct in concluding that this 
constitutes a fire fighting activity under subsection (18)(b). Therefore, the City retains 
immunity from suit and the trial court should be affirmed. 
A. Fighting Fire is More than Holding a Hose and Wielding an Axe at the 
Scene of an Inferno; it Includes Ensuring There is Water in Hydrants 
to Make it Possible to Fight Fire. 
1. Government cannot fight fire without water. 
Neither the Utah Supreme Court nor this Court have yet determined what it means 
to be engaged in the activity of fighting fire under subsection (18)(b).n In interpreting 
any statute, the primary objective is to give effect to the Legislature's intent. See Lyon v. 
Burton, 2000 UT 19, ^ fl7, 5 P.3d 616. The starting point in determining that intent is the 
statute's plain language. See id. Here, the plain language provides immunity from suit if 
the injury "arises out of, in connection with, or results from . . . the activities of. . . 
fighting fire." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(18)(b). 
Because the alleged injuries in the instant case occurred prior to July 1, 
2004, the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, which are contained in 
chapter 30, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -38 (repealed 2004), apply rather than the 
"Governmental Immunity Act of Utah," which is now contained in Title 63G, Chapter 
7 of the Utah Code. See Cook v. City of Moroni, 2005 UT App 40, [^1 n.l, 107 P.3d 
713; see H.B. 68, 57th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2008) (re-codification of Title 63, 
Chapter 30d). 
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 In Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, 5 P.3d 616, the Utah Supreme Court had its 
first opportunity to address the issue but decided the case using a more specific 
subsection of 63-30-10. See id, at THf 16, 18-19 &n.5. 
Plaintiffs focus on the term "fight" and argue that the words "fighting fire" limit 
the immunity to only first responders in the midst of fighting an inferno. See Plf. Br. at 
23-24. But that interpretation defies logic. Although the Legislature did not define the 
outer limits of "fighting fire" in subsection (18)(b), it surely recognized the simple fact 
that a city cannot fight fire by throwing rocks. A city fights fire with water. And, on the 
scene of a fire, it obtains water from the nearest fire hydrant. It logically follows then, 
that a city's actions to increase water pressure to increase fire flows to provide water to 
hydrants is necessarily a fire fighting activity. 
In this regard, Plaintiffs' trivializing the City's actions, which Plaintiffs do, as 
nothing more than "installing a new water line" is not accurate. The City did not 
haphazardly lay pipe in the ground for no reason. Rather, it is undisputed that the City's 
actions were specifically calculated to protect its citizens—to ensure there was water in 
hydrants to enable the City to fight a fire should one occur. 
Indeed, the "physical battle" that Plaintiffs say must occur for subsection (18)(b) 
to apply can never be won if the fire fighters are not equipped to fight the battle. It is a 
time honored principle that preparation is as essential to the battle as the battle itself, for 
without adequate preparation, the battle is lost before it is ever fought. See, e.g.. Sun 
Tzu, The Art of War 83 (Samuel B. Griffith trans., Oxford Press 1963) ("To . . . not 
prepare is the greatest of crimes; to be prepared beforehand for any contingency is the 
greatest of virtues"). In fact, this principle is expressed in the very definition of 
"fighting," which includes: "to try to overcome; struggle against or contend with, as by 
<JTPr 7 7 0 ^ 0 7 ^ n 
argument, legislation, etc."; "to engage in or carry on"; "power or readiness to fight," 
Webster's New World College Dictionary 528 (2006), "To contend with or struggle 
against"; "To try to prevent the development or success of," Dictionary.com 
(www.dictionary.reference. com/browse/fight (last visited August 4, 2009). 
Consequently, Plaintiffs' narrow view of what constitutes fire fighting activities cannot 
be sustained. 
2. The weight of authority recognizes that fire fighting activities 
includes activities necessary to ensure the ability to fight fire. 
Moreover, case authority from other jurisdictions that have defined what it means 
to engage in fire fighting activities are consistent in reasoning that it necessarily includes 
activities related to ensuring water pressure in hydrants as well as other activities 
calculated to ensure that a battle against fire can be won. For example, in Maust v. 
Fireman's Relief Ass'n, 282 A.2d 239 (Pa. 1971), the court stated that fire fighting has 
evolved over time and reasoned that a conclusion that limits the definition of "fighting 
fires" to "pulling hose, squirting water, or driving a truck is hard to fathom." Id. at 240. 
Similarly, in Oughton v. Board of Fire Commissioners, 403 A.2d 69 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 1979), rev'd in part on other grounds, 429 A.2d 1059 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1981), the court stated, "[a]ny effort to define Tirefighting', without express statutory 
While the dictionary is a useful guide in determining the ordinary and accepted 
meaning of terms, see Hercules Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2000 UT App 372, ^|9, 
21 P.3d 231 (citations omitted), it does not yield a precise definition of the phrase 
"fighting fire" or of "fighting" itself. As a result, we look to case law that has addressed 
the ordinary and accepted meaning of these terms for guidance. See Sharon Steel Corp. 
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127, 135 & n.9 (Utah 1997) (where dictionary 
provides no single definition, court looks to case law as an aide to determine meaning). 
direction, must fail. It is apparent that the person uho >h HI- others in firefighting 
readies the equipment for use, and who maintains firefighting records, is as much 
involved in fighting fires as the person who holds the hose or wields the axe." Id. at 73. 
I . ;;;^  specnic LUIUCM i)i governmental immunity, courts consistently recognize 
that issues •• • • * •.< . • • < : •*. -h t-..*. 
fire and thu^ cninlcui lo immuniiv. i or example, in Zacharie v. City of San Antonio, the 
court reasoned ma! L Insuring that an adequate amount of water is available to hydrants 
1S I K X C W i r : ' ••• : . - ! • • • •- . • i r l i i i i i " ; | i i i l f | i i i i i i i i i i i i i 11 ,'i, (| l l i r m ! I \ h n n i 11. i h i I il II 
under the Texas Tort Claims Act. 952 S.W.2d 56, 59 (iex. - ^ iw-- ). In Gates v. 
Town of Chandler, the court held a govemment entity immune tram liability for failure to 
maintain .in .ulcu . - . . * * ' - * protection ^-c . . N L . 
App "M'lOin And in \ alle\ I ille Co. \. San. Jose Water C\>.. 67 Cal. Rpti. 2d OJO (CM. 
Ct. App i W7). the California Court of Appeals reversed a judgment against a water 
cuinpai- ; uamage caused by the water company's negligent maintenance of a water 
line. See kl. at o44. There, the court determined tnal o - n though tlir dammu NN«I*» HI it 
"fire related/* /1 .. occurred in the absence of an actual fire, the water company was 
r -. ;. immune becausi -i^ u^-nape was reL^d ^ '.ire protection through 
maintenance of necessary \MIUT lines. 
Courts in other jurisdictions are in accord in reasoning that water supply and fire 
fi.ghti.ng go .idi:,. .)i Jamil. See, e.g.. Cross v. City of Kansas City, 638 P.2d 933, 937 
<5TO 9 7 ( 1 ^ 0 7 n 1 
(Kan. 1982) ("a municipality or one of its agencies in the operation of a public 
waterworks, which also serves as the water supply for fire-fighting purposes, does so in a 
dual capacity and the furnishing of water for fire fighting is done in a governmental 
capacity and therefore falls under the cloak of immunity granted by the statute."); Stang 
v. City of Mill Valley. 240 P.2d 980, 982 (Calif. 1952) (recognizing common law rule 
that municipality is not liable for fire loss "due to an insufficient supply of water because 
of negligence in the upkeep of the city's waterworks system, in that water pipes and 
hydrants became clogged and fell into disrepair"); Jones v. Village of Willow Springs, 
608 N.E,2d 298, 302 (111. App. Ct. 1992) (affirming dismissal of claim against city for 
failure to maintain adequate supply of water and pressure to operate hydrants); City of 
Hammond v. Cipichu 788 N.E.2d 1273, 1283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) ("a municipality is 
immune from liability for damages resulting from the failure to provide suitable 
firefighting equipment or an adequate supply of water"). 
In fact, this was the rule in Utah long before the 1965 adoption of the Immunity 
Act, as the Utah Supreme Court took a broad view of fire fighting, stating the general 
rule: "there is no liability if the negligent act was done in the extinguishment of fire, or 
in connection with flushing hydrants solely to better fire protection, or the like." 
Egelhoff v. Ogden City, 267 P. 1011, 1012-13 (Utah 1928). See also Brown v. Salt Lake 
City, 93 P. 570 (Utah 1908) (use of municipal water system for fire protection is a 
governmental function and therefore entitled to immunity); accord Standiford v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1233 (Utah 1980). Though this statement in Egelhoff 
was dicta, it reflects a broad view of fire fighting in this state dating back to the early part 
of the ; 1900s ; 
Thus, the v>\ji*-/hl of audionh nvognizes the apparent—fighting fire is more than 
wielding an axe and hose at the scene of an inferno. It is a process that includes ensuring 
t h e r e iS S U I I 1 C K : . •• .. - : - * . '-i ' . f •• •• • » • • , 
necessarily inch ides increasing water pressure to ensure sufficient fire flows in residential 
neighborhoods like the Majestic View subdivision. 
Against LIK, ^ U L ^ *.. *; ,,..*.:... ,:-. ';a,mi;.-. i i^i <>m\ Lyon v. nunon. ^JL ; ::. 
Br at 2 1 Plaintiffs contei id tl lat inLyoi.. \ ) tal I Si lpreme Court held that a fire chief 
driving to the scene of a fire is not a fire fighting activity under subsection (18)(b) and 
therefore, the argument goes, increasing water pressure iii i.^lmiu > a h o canno^ be * fire 
Lyon, the court expressly declined to address subsection (18)(b), instead deciding the 
case under a more specific subsection of 63-30-10. See 2000 UT 19 at 1fl[16, 18-1 ° ^ 
n 5, Specifically the coi n t detei mil led tl lat tl ie facts in I ;yoii: a fire chief t )perating an 
emergency vehicle in response to a fire alarm required application of Utah Lode section 
63~3u! ; '•< i") ("the operation of an. emergency vehicle" in response to a fire alarm) rather 
ti IOJ L I io ii i } h becai lse si u >:>oi w n i (15) w a s tl: ie • ii ie i e spe cific pi o\ isioi i applicat Ie tc the 
situation. See id. at ^ 1 7 - 1 8 (reasoning that "[s]tandin^ alonr. hubsectioi. \ !> '(h)| could 
arguably apply to this case,, but we conclii.de that because subsection (15) applies with 
greater specificity, it should govern."). As a result, the supreme court's decision in Lyon 
1 o 
has no bearing on this case. 
3. "Activities" is a term of enlargement which precludes a 
restrictive interpretation of the phrase "fighting fire." 
Another flaw in Plaintiffs' argument is that they impermissibly isolate the words 
"fighting fire" from the preceding and qualifying term "activities." To properly 
determine the statute's meaning, effect must be given to each "word, phrase, clause, and 
sentence^]" Sindt v. Retirement Board, 2007 UT 16, ^ 8, 157 P.3d 797. "Activities" is a 
term of enlargement that is used to encompass a broad range of specific things that fall 
under a more general subject matter; thus eliminating the need to set forth each specific 
thing that is meant to be covered under the general term. See, e.g.. Carbide & Carbon 
Chemical Corp. v.. Carson, 239 S.W.2d 27, 37 (Tenn. 1951) (reasoning the use of term 
"activities" in legislation was done so advisedly "for the purpose of covering everything" 
that the agency at issue did and that "[b]y using such a broad term it of course was not 
necessary to set out specific instances of different things that the [agency] did so as to 
exempt them because the word activities covered all of these things"); Miller v. Bureau 
of Revenue, 599 P.2d 1049, 1053 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979) (Sutin, J., concurring) (defining 
"construction activities" to include hauling materials to construction site rather than 
Lyon was actually a fractured decision producing several different opinions. 
And any statements by members of the court in the various opinions issued in Lyon as it 
relates to interpreting subsection (18)(b) are dicta, and not binding on this Court. See 
DeBrv v. Noble, 880 P.2d 428, 435 (Utah 1995) (judicial statements made in the course 
of an argument do not constitute a holding); Knight v. Chamberlain, 315 P.2d 273, 274-
75 (Utah 1957) (statements in prior opinions that address issues not before the court are 
"dicta and of no particular concern as precedent"). 
l imiting term, to only those activities occurring at point where actual construction takes 
place) . 
Had the Legislature intended to limit "fighting fire" to only first responder 
situations, it could easily ha \ c done so b \ not ty ins the phrase "fighting fire" to the 
enlarging I^YU. activities.
 ; could have t ,*)>„\^ -he except ion in its own subsection in 
63-30-10 as opposed to s u b ^ ction ( IS) and MI ich stall d \nn nihil IJ» lu thr el In I nil 
"government retains immunilv when engaged in fighting a fire/ Rut it did not. It tied 
the phrase ^lighting 3ire a- ..iv. enlarging term "activities;," thus indicating an intent to 
co v er. i mc- • • • t l lat arises on it Df ai i> acti v ity i:t lat is i mdei tak 21 1 
for the purpose of fighting fire. This would include the f ireman on the scene wielding 
hose and axe, the individual flushing hydrants to ensure correct and proper operation, 
delivery to fight fire. 
4 . Public policy favors adop t i on of the interpretation that bes t 
promotes jpnv tcrh:m <>f the pub l i c . 
Finally, adopting I 'lah ltiffs' 1 lai: 1 o\ s ii lterpretatioi 1 w 01 ilcl lead tc a 1 e •si ill: that 
immunizes governmenta l entities when commit t ing a negl igent act on the scene o f the 
outbrcaN ol a n u . oui )n»id them liable for a negligent act whi le engaged in activities 
v i l l i in r r i i i h i i . iiin 111 1  n» .in m i d i i n i i ^ n i UK* 111 t h e e s e i i l n l iiii n i i l l i i i M k , S i n In ,i iiiln i, mini 
swal low the rationale. It would eliminate all incentive for government to act to prepare 
for and better equip t hemseh i> {•  • r -1 t ^ - Indeed, the pol icy behind the Immuni ty Act 
i.'- T- -.'-.::.:* a .:i - \ .7 .-. c::.ii:Cii; u i u i u u k e s an activity to ensure the 
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public health and safety, it should do so without fear of assuming potential liability 
should it perform inadequately. See DeBrv v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 441-442 (Utah 1995) 
(activities related to the public safety, health, and welfare are uniquely governmental and 
"[f]ar more persons would suffer if government did not perform these functions at all 
than would be benefitted by permitting recovery in those cases where the government is 
shown to have performed inadequately" (citation omitted)). 
Taken to its logical conclusion, if the Court adopts Plaintiffs' position, it has 
effectively ruled that the City should have done nothing. And rather than bringing on a 
new line and increasing the pressure in its gravity fed system, fearing that it might 
adversely affect downstream residents, the City should have simply waited instead to find 
its immunity on the scene of an inferno as water trickles from the hose while property is 
engulfed in flames and lives are in danger. It is a nonsensical result that does not 
promote the protection of the public. As such, it cannot be the law. See Perrine v. 
Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah 1996) (courts must construe statutes 
to avoid "absurd" and "nonsensical" results that are not in accord with the statute's 
purpose); Clover Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991) (stating that if 
there is any doubt or uncertainty about a statute's meaning, the court should adopt the 
interpretation that will "'best promote the protection of the public'" (quoting Curtis v. 
Harmon Electronics, 575 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1978))). 
The trial court recognized this. It simply followed the "fundamental rule of 
statutory interpretation" that subsection (18)(b) "should be looked at in its entirety and in 
accordance with the purpose which was sought to be accomplished^]" Salt Lake City v. 
S a l t i q u i ^ u u i i i ; ^ - 1 . 
B. Water Supply is an Integral and Necessary Part of U tab Statutes 
Governing Fire Fighting. 
In addition to interpreting the Immunity Act itself, we cannot ignore other statutes 
V ! ' ' ' ' ' : • * * - ' ' * ':. ' i1 . >^C J LJ- :J i 1 . IJ Lclll V l HJifl V V . W i l l i ! I MJ- . '* i ' 
707, 709 (Utah ^ ^ ; (/'it is natural or reasonable to think that the understanding of the 
legislature or of persons affected by the statute would be influenced by another statute, 
tl: len tl lose statu ites shoi ild 1: e coi isti i; led to be in pat imatei ia, constriK . . . . 
one another and harmonized if possible"). 
This reveals that the trial court's interpretation of subsection (18)(b) is consistent 
withotfiu i la;; ;ui;,.;c . :i,u! rccogni/.c .-a .\aier supp;* .; an integral and necessary part 
o1'-". > fi'^ hi .;. .^ec^cnLruis;. ,:• * "*'.• . - * .• vet) * l 
53, chap. 7 (2002). For example, the 1 Mali Fire Prevention and Safety Act requires 
municipalities to establish IIIL nuw anc -vater supply requirements for the purpose of 
for equipment standards, including for hydrants and related connections, which are all 
part, of a municipal water system... See id. § 53-7-206. 
1 ' * • %] ' t_ : i * C L . i u . C 
Code was applicable during the time period in question. It contains specific requirements 
governing fire flow, hydrant locations, and inspection, testing, and maintenance of wafer-
based fire protectioi i. s> stems. See 1 99 1 1 Jniform Fire Code App. ; *, :, i -
(relevant sections attached at Addendum 5). In addition, during the time period in 
question, Utah law expressly required municipalities to maintain "a minimum of pressure 
of 20 p s i . . . at all time and at all points in the distribution system." Utah Admin. Code 
R309-550(5)(e) (2004) (amended 2006). This requirement was specifically for fire 
protection. See id. 
In light of these statutory and regulatory requirements, it would make no sense to 
restrict the definition of "fire fighting," as used in the Immunity Act, to exclude the 
City's activities in this case, as they are expressly required and contemplated in other 
statutes addressing the broad issues of fire prevention and safety. In sum, the City's 
actions in increasing the water pressure to the Majestic View subdivision is conduct 
arising out the activity of fighting fire and the City is therefore immune from suit under 
subsection (18)(b). The trial court was correct and should be affirmed. 
III. THE CITY WAS PERFORMING A DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION AND 
IS THEREFORE IMMUNE FROM SUIT. 
A. Discretionary Function Immunity was Presented Below and Provides 
an Alternative Basis to Affirm the Trial Court. 
If this Court disagrees with the trial court's interpretation of subsection (18)(b), 
there is an alternative basis to affirm the trial court's summary judgment ruling— 
discretionary function immunity. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1). Discretionary 
function immunity was presented to the trial court below as an alternative basis for 
summary judgment. [R. 391-419, 519-611, 686 Tr. 14:1-9.] And although the trial court 
did not base its decision on this ground, "it is well settled that an appellate court may 
aflirrn the judgment appealed from,,, 'if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory 
apparenl on the record n en l l iough such ground r flu-1111/ r l i l tcp. trnin ih.il M-iii <1 l i- il < 
trial court to be the basis of its ruling or actio; i )ipoma v. McPhie, 2001 U1 6 J * • .\ 
29 P.3d 1225 (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 461 P.2d 290.. 293 n 2 
(I J tali, 1,969)). 
Because the alternate ground for affii 1 nance was extensively briefed and argi led by 
the parlies helou . Il is "apparent on the record1' and this Court should address il as ar 
alternative ;KIM , «J; uKirmance. *;• i.vi.
 r,i u. w other areas of law is this concept more 
c l ' . ' , T i . i l l M h • , . >' •,> ' . . : , - - , i l U l i i l H i l l l l l I l l l l l H l i l i l ' A l l P ' l U ' \ I Hil  1 /•. 
the City immuniu "from suit[.J" Utah Code Ann. § 63 JO ^ ^ p p . 2003); Mecham v. 
Frazier. 2woS i r 60. ^ 1 L 13. 19^ P ^d 630. Immunitv from suit differs from immunity 
from li - • • . , iiff 
cannot legal 1) file a lawsuit naming the ! vo\ ernmcntal] entity as a defendant/ Stale ^ 
Nieto, 993 P.2d 493. 50? fCol * ?{MHM in other words, immunity from suit is the 
Smith v. Rogers Group. Jnc ., 12 S.W.3d 4505 4o0 ^Ark. 2002). See_a]so Cartel_ \_J. :NI\_. 
of Utah, 2006 I ; 1 78. ^10. 150 P.3d 467 (maintenance of a cause of action against a 
g* * \ ; : •
 :; u •.' • • • > • e \ -j cp i..: i. .. i doctrine of Sovereign 
Immunity). 
Thus. imrmmih que^lion^ should be resolved C£Catthe earliest possible stage in 
litigation[;J because M I -a*, entiilement not to stanu u ia: oi iaee the other burden^ of 
STG 270639.7 1(1 
litigation"5 that is '"effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.'" 
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-201 (2001) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 
511, 525 (1985)). As explained by the Supreme Court, the burdens of a trial on 
governmental entities are not limited to monetary expenses. See Mitchell 472 U.S. at 
526. They include "'the general costs of subjecting [public] officials to the risks of 
trial—distraction of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary 
action, and deterrence of able people from public service.'" IcL (quoting Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982)). Accordingly, because the record is well 
developed, the Court should address this critical legal issue and terminate the litigation. 
B. Determining the Course of Action Regarding Operation of a Water 
System for the Purpose of Protecting the Public Safety and Welfare 
is a Judgment of the Kind that Discretionary Function Immunity 
was Designed to Shield. 
The discretionary function doctrine retains immunity for a governmental entity if 
the injury complained of "arises out of, in connection with, or results from the exercise or 
performance, or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function, whether or not 
the discretion is abused[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1). "Discretionary function 
immunity under section 63-30-10 is designed 'to shield those governmental acts and 
decisions impacting on large numbers of people in a myriad of unforeseen ways from 
individual and class legal actions, the continual threat of which would make the public 
administration all but impossible.'" Keegan, 896 P.2d at 623 (quoting Hansen v. Salt 
Lake City, 794 P.2d 838, 846 (Utah 1990) (citation omitted)). 
To determine whether a governmental action qualifies for discretionary function 
immun it>
 ? this Com I: mi ist appl> the foi « pa.!* t "I ittl e" test: 
(1) Does the challenged act, omission. 01 decision necessarily involve a 
basic governmental policy, program. 01 LLjLcthe? 
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or deacon essential tr th~ 
realization or accomplishment < f il M pohe\. program, or onjeeave 
as opposed to one which would nui enanue iKi •>(v.\v<c »*•• -?^LMM;"" 
of the policy, program.., or objective? 
(3) Does the act. omission, or decision require the exercise of basic 
policy evaluation judgment, and expertise on the part ofihe 
governmental agency inv olved? 
(4) Docs tnc iio\cn.menial aucjic} imoAeci p o ^ c ^ the requisite 
constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or make 
the challenged act, omission, or decision? 
Johnson v. UtahDcp't olTransp., 2006 ITT 15. ^22. 1 ^ P Id 102 (quoting Little v. Utah 
State Uw. oi j uhiiiv Sci VJ.. - * • •• • du ' v\ ."<• i-. 
of the Little test. 
1. Public safety, health, and welfare are basic 
governmental objectives. 
It is i indispi ited in this case that tl le City's decisions to e xpai id its w atei s>< stei :i i. lb ' 
funding, designing, constructing, and ultimately bringing the Southern Transmission Luc 
into service to increase the water pressure was for the purpose of providing sufficient fire 
f l * ' • ' ' • • - . ] , •• 
in so doing, the City acted to ensure public safety, health, and welfare. It is also beyond 
dispute that these goals further basic governmental objectives. See Johnson v. Utah 
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Dep'tofTransp., 2006 UT 15 at ^[23-24 (ensuring public safety is a basic governmental 
objective). The City thus satisfies the first element. 
2. The City's actions were essential to the realization of the 
objective of public safety, health, and welfare. 
Second, the challenged actions in this case—the City's expansion of its water 
system to ensure adequate fire flow—were directly related, in fact, solely related, and 
essential to the realization of the objective the City sought to achieve. The Southern 
Transmission line was brought into service for the purpose of increasing the water 
pressure to the higher elevations in the Majestic View subdivision to ensure that those 
residents had sufficient fire flow and water at the point of delivery. Stated differently, the 
City was faced with a public health and safety problem. Its objective was to address that 
problem through design and implementation of policy. Its decisions and actions were 
directly related to addressing that problem and those decisions and actions are at issue in 
this case. Because the challenged actions were essential to the objective of ensuring and 
furthering the public safety, health, and welfare, the second element is therefore satisfied. 
See, e.g., Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, [^18, 57 P.3d 1007 (decisions touching on 
safety clearly affect the accomplishment of the objective of public safety); Keegan v. 
State, 896 P.2d 618, 624 (Utah 1995). 
3. The City exercised basic policy evaluation, judgment, 
and expertise. 
Third, the City exercised basic policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise in 
addressing the safety, health, and welfare issues facing its citizens. Here again, the issue 
is the design, operation, and maintenance <>i Uic C a y ' s water system.—specifically, the 
protection to citizens in higher elevations of the Majestic View subdivision. Providing an 
essential service for the public health, safety, and welfare is at the core of governmental 
c\- ; • < •* Sec jvock^ .v|inii_udi_i_i_ i'hrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp „ / 8 1 P.2d !• 59., 
462 (Utah 1989). Actions and decisions related to providing water for, and deter nun - ,; 
how best lo pro\ ide fire protection for its citizens are basic policy e\ aluations. 
judgmc-
 ( i ,r:L [o municipal governments, Nee id. (recognizing that 
"fire protection" ib fc"uiuqucl\ ^numine"-;.!!'"'. Sec, e.g.. U.Conne_ii_\_.. i own _^ 
Schererville, 779 N.E.2d 16, 20 (Ind Ct. App. 2002) (stating " [ g o v e r n m e n t provides lire 
prote^iiwii as an essential puolu; scv\ ic^ because JUL. like ciime. is a common enemy"). 
a considerable strain on its infrastructure and substantial demand on its water system. 
1 he Cit) Council and city officials were concerned about the specific issue of the lack, of 
elevations, including the Majestic View subdivision. The City Council, with input from 
City officials and engineers, discussed and debated the alternatives and solutions, both 
tempo! ai\ »u id h nim m in nil I In \ discuss* d picsnii iiecu .IIHI Inline iiiovuli ihey 
discussed the costs of different proposals and how to P:IV for them; the*, discussed % •--./ 
any expansion of the water system, to address the problem, would, impact on its culinary 
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water master plan; and ultimately, the City settled on the addition of the Southern 
Transmission line to its water system. 
The undisputed record in this case establishes that policy considerations drove the 
City's actions. Faced with an inadequate supply of water for fire protection and the 
absence of water service to its citizens, and in the face of continued growth, the City 
acted accordingly in deciding what actions to take to correct the problems. Surely public 
policy favors the protection of person and property from fire, as well as making sure 
water is available for the basic public health and safety of the citizenry. Moreover, the 
costs associated with the expansion of a water system certainly have an economic impact 
on the City. 
The underlying decisions in this case were integral to the exercise of the discretion 
afforded to the City and its officials and these decisions must be protected, otherwise we 
are left with the inexplicable situation in which City officials would have the discretion to 
run the water system, the duty to provide fire protection and water supply to its citizens, 
but no discretion to determine how to do so. The expansion of the City's water system to 
include the Southern Transmission line, the timing and manner of doing so, and the acts 
taken to increase the water pressure, necessarily involved a level of economic and social 
decision making for which the discretionary function exception applies. See Laney, 2002 
UT 79 at [^19 (holding that if the decision at issue involves, "at minimum, a basic cost-
benefit analysis and exercise of financial expertise and judgment by the City[,]" it is 
sufficient to satisfy the third part of the Little test); Price v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 
2000 TJX App 333, ^ 39, 14 V3d 702 (third element of Little test met where city 
budgetary and other practical restraints); Keegan v. Stale. 896 P.2d 6185 624 (Utah 1995) 
(third element of Little test met where government studies remedies along with costs and 
GCVI >ions are made .:. me mgncst polic> making lev el). 
I lere, the City engaged in exactly the 1> pe of departnv- " - *•'. -isidiTifioi. .- l 
evaluation. am: -.veighing of policies that our supreme court has determined entitles a 
muiMupaliiv to discretionary function protection. See, e.g., J ohnson v. Utah Dep?t of 
Transp., 2006 1 J I ' 15 at |^32 (iii idicating that ii I siti lations w hei e the "go^ ei nment 
effectively demonstrated department-wide consideration and evaluation, and an 
incontestable weighing of the policies at issue," discretionary function immunity is 
merited). ••• . 
The court in Olson v. City of Garrison, 539 N.W.2d 663 (N.D. 1995) examined a 
similar issue. There, the plaintiff sued the cii\ for flooding that occurred on the 
p ' i - •' •
 r . v .*.i i • . . . . P C I Id . , 
determined that the cil* ''• < Mutation of its water system involved conduct intended to be 
shielded by the discretionary 1 unction exception because economic considerations drove 
the cit> ' s actions i egarding tl le operation and maintenance of its system.. See id. ai hh7-
68. Ultimately, the court immunized the city, reasoning that it w as in the city- 's discretion 
to determine how best to allocate resources related to operation and maintenance of its 
system... ui. ai ^ «-
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The same is true of the City's actions in this case. Perhaps in hindsight anyone 
can argue or question the manner in which the City remedied the issue. The City could 
have spent considerably more money to design and construct a pipeline delivery system 
that did not operate on a gravity fed basis so that the City could increase pressure in the 
higher elevations without increasing it below. But it is not for Plaintiffs or the courts to 
second guess the City's actions. That is the essence of the discretionary function 
exception. See Little, 667 P.2d at 51 ("[w]here the responsibility for basic policy 
decisions has been committed to one of the branches of our tripartite system of 
government, the courts have refrained from sitting in judgment of the propriety of those 
decisions"); Price, 2002 UT App 333 at ^39 (even though hindsight may suggest city's 
decision was wrong, if decision was discretionary city is immune). See also, e.g., Welch 
v. City of Appleton, 666 N.W.2d 511,515 (Wise. Ct. App. 2003) (design and 
construction of system are generally discretionary acts and even if system is poorly 
designed a municipal government is immune). See also McQuiLLlN MUN. CORP. § 
53.105 (3rd ed. 1993) (when water system is used for fire protection "a municipality has 
discretion, governed by the extent of need and other economic considerations, to 
determine what is a reasonable protection for each area[.]"). 
The City has satisfied the third element of the Little test. 
4. The City had the requisite authority for its decision. 
Const, art. XI, <> ^ (.urantine municipalities broad power to, inter alia, furnish e 
services and make public improvements); Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-14(l)(a) (2007) 
(UMIUIU; hiuL , i. .. . . ,v»: ,. e. ^ onsiruct, mauwaii, and operate waterworks 
systems >, § i\ i b j :,) \ ; u u i H >rj z i i ig i i u u i it ; i | J; illtieis i < > < x in: -i in in ; i ( i: ai ithorize the consti i iction 
of waterworks wiihm e- . ^hon t u i \ limits): $ 10-K-S5 (authorizing fire protection 
operations as deemed necessary * * -m municipality): £^3- 7-?04(4)(c>) (requiring 
fighting fire). The final element is therefore satisfied. 
IV. : THE WOODS 9 APPEAL AND SUBSTANTIVE CLAIMS A R E 
I I N T I M ^ T V AND BARRED. 
A. The 
In December ?(}n'\ ihib Court dismissed the Woods' appeal for lack of 
jiu t >UM, lion, reasoning: "The Woodses filed their notice of appeal more than thirh d.^ s 
a ft CM lite en(n el the m'tUzv dcnutig |nmd< i md is llur- 'in ill mi K II an appeal in»t 
timely filed, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal and must dismiss it." 
Woods v. Washington City, 2007 UT App 398, at para. 3, (I Jtah Ct. App. Dee. 20, 2007) 
the time for filing the appeal, stating: 
The Woodses assert that their notice of appeal was limeh filed because 
they tiled a motion for reconsideration that tolled the time for filing their notice of 
appeal. ! foweue v~i ! "i;?h Supreme Court has ruled that motions to reconsider 
are not recognized by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and do not toll the time 
for filing a notice of appeal. Therefore, the time for appeal ran from the order 
entered on August 6, 2007. 
Id at para. 4 (citing Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, f7, 135 P.3d 861). 
If the Woods did not agree with this Court's decision, they were free to either 
petition this Court for rehearing or the Utah Supreme Court for certiorari. See Utah R. 
App. P. 35, 45. But they are not free to have Plaintiffs prop open the doors to this Court 
so they can sneak their appeal in a second time, pretending as if this Court's prior order 
never existed. 
The facts are unchanged: the Woods had thirty days from August 6, 2007, to file a 
notice of appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a). They did not do so. Merely waiting to argue 
the case in a brief filed nearly two years later does not magically vest this Court with 
jurisdiction. Rather, as before, the Woods failure to timely file a notice of appeal 
deprives this Court of jurisdiction to consider the appeal. See Serrato v. Utah Transit 
Auth., 2000 UT App 299, f7, 13 P.3d 616. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss the 
Woods' appeal. See Varian-Eimac Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (stating u[w]hen a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it retains only the 
authority to dismiss the action"). 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Denied the Woods' Motion to Intervene as 
Untimely, Because the Woods Never Timely Filed a Notice of Claim. 
Were the Court to consider the merits of the Woods' appeal, the result is 
unchanged. The trial court correctly denied the Woods' motion as untimely. The 
Immunity Act states that "[a]ny person having a claim for injury against a governmental 
entity . . . shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining the 
action[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2). The notice of claim must be filed within one 
year after the claim arises. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2), -13 (1997). Failure to 
strictly follow the notice of claim requirements "deprives a court of subject matter 
jurisdiction and precludes a claimant from bringing suit against a governmental entity." 
Greene v. Utah Transit Auttu 2001 UT 109, |20, 37 P.3d 1156. 
It is undisputed that the Woods have never filed a notice of claim with the City. 
[R. 206, 211-212.] The only notice of claim filed in this case named three individuals, 
none of whom were Steven or Allison Woods. [R. 214-25.] Though the notice also 
stated "other residents of the Majestic View subdivision^]" [R. 214], that is not enough 
to satisfy the requirements of section 63-30-11(2) as it relates to the Woods. Rather, the 
law is clear: "each plaintiffs name must be on the notice of claim." Pigs Gun Club, Inc. 
v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17,1[10, 42 P.3d 379. See also Heideman, 2007 UT App 11 
at *p n.l (noting that party was barred from pursing claim against City as a co-plaintiff 
because its name did not appear in the notice of claim). 
Therefore, because the Woods never filed a notice of claim with the City, they 
cannot sue the City. See Greene, 2001 UT 109 at [^20. Because they are barred from 
suing the City, they cannot join or intervene in this case as plaintiffs. Moreover, because 
the injury occurred in August 2003, the Woods have missed their one year window in 
which to file a notice of claim and are therefore forever barred from maintaining a suit 
against the City. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13. Accordingly, the trial court correctly 
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denied the Woods' motion as untimely for failure to file a notice of claim within the one 
year requirement of the Immunity Act. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court should be affirmed. 
DATED THIS lA day of August 200'J. 
DURHAM JONES & PEVEGAR, P.C. 
BRYAN J E T T I S O N 
Attorneys for Washington City 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
In accordance with Utah R. App. P. 26(b), I, Bryan J. Pattison, certify that on 
August > H , 2009,1 caused two (2) copies of Appellant's BRIEF FOR APPELLEE 
WASHINGTON CITY, to be served upon counsel for Appellant in this matter, via first 
class mail with sufficient postage prepaid, to the following address: 
Justin D. Heideman 
Heideman McKay Hugely & Olson, LLC 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 180 
Provo,Utah 84604 
Attorneys for Appellant 
BRYAN J T ^ T T I S O N 
Tabl 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
UTAH CODE § 63-30-10(18)(b) (repealed 2004), which provides: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee 
committed within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out 
of, in connection with, or results from: 
(18) the activities of: 
(b) fighting fire; 
* * * 
UTAH CODE § 63-30-10(1) (repealed 2004), which provides: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee 
committed within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out 
of, in connection with, or results from: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform 
a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
* * * 
UTAH CODE § 63-30-11(2) (repealed 2004), which provides: 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental 
entity, or against its employee for an act or omission occurring during 
the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority shall file a written notice of 
claim with the entity before maintaining an action, regardless of whether 
or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 
* * * 
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UTAH ADMIN. CODE R309-550(5) (2004) (amended 2006), which provides: 
(5) Fire Protection 
(a) The design of the distribution system shall be consistent with 
Appendix III-A and III-B of the 1991 Uniform Fire Code. As specified in 
this code, minimum fire-flow requirements are: 
(i) 1000 gpm for one- and two-family dwellings with an area 
of less than 3600 square feet. 
(ii) 1500 gpm or greater for all other buildings. 
(b) The location of fire hydrants shall be consistent with Appendix 
III-B of the 1991 Uniform Fire Code. As specified in this code, average 
spacing between hydrants must be no greater than 500 ft. 
(c) An exception to the fire protection requirements of (a) and (b) 
may be granted if a suitable statement is received from the local fire 
protection authority. 
(d) Water mains not designed to carry fire flows shall not have fire 
hydrants connected to them. 
(e) The design engineer shall verify that the pipe network design 
permits fire-flows to be met at representative locations while a minimum 
pressure of 20 psi is maintained at all times and at all points in the 
distribution system. 
(f) As a minimum, the flows to be assumed during a fire-flow 
analysis shall be the "peak day demand" plus the fire flow requirement. 
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Bryan J. Pattison (8766) 
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Attorneys for Washington City 
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IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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WASHINGTON CITY, and 10 unknown 
persons working for or under the authority of 
Washington City, Inc., and JOHN DOES I-
XII, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No 040500378 
Judge James L. Shumate 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant Washington City's motions for 
summary judgment on Plaintiffs' remaining claims. The Court held a heanng on the motions on 
January 6, 2009. Having reviewed and considered the parties' memoranda and argument at the, 
the Court concludes that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact that might preclude 
entry of summary judgment. The Court further concludes that Defendant Washington City is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, it is undisputed that the City's reason for 
*-*<;3 ^ .10 
, ; ! . . "» J ' « - u J rTY 
ft 
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increasing the water pressure in the Majestic View subdivision was for the purpose of providing 
sufficient fire flow at fire hydrants for fire protection purposes. This action constitutes a fire 
fighting activity and therefore the City is immune from suit under section 63-30-10(18)(b) of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Further, the Court grants the City's motion to strike the 
affidavit of John Daniel Thorpe because the affidavit is insufficient under Rule 56(e) standards 
and otherwise contradicts Mr. Thorpe's prior sworn deposition testimony. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and dismisses Plaintiffs' claims. 
DATED THIS Z j day of W ^ ^ 1 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge 
. - rs 
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Washington City, and 10 
unknown persons working for 
or under the authority of 
the Washington City, Inc., 
and John Does I-XII, 
Defendants and 
Appellees. 
Steve and Allison Woods, 
Intervenors and 
Appellants. 
ORDER AND SUA SPONTE 
MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
Case No. 20070779-CA 
This is before the court on Washington City's motion to 
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction based on the absence 
of a final, appealable order. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Washington City's motion to 
dismiss is denied. 
After review of the record and the filings in this appeal, 
another jurisdictional issue has arisen. This appeal is being 
considered for summary disposition on the basis that this court 
lacks jurisdiction due to an untimely filed notice of appeal. 
In lieu of a brief, both parties shall file a memorandum, 
not to exceed ten pages, explaining why summary disposition 
should, or should not, be granted by the court. Failure to file 
a memorandum may result in the granting of the motion. 
An original and four copies of the memorandum should be 
filed with the clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals on or before 
December 3, 2 007. 
tit DATED this \W day of November, 2007. 
J^U&^AI.&bu^L 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
20070779-CA 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on November 15, 2007, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing SUA SPONTE MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
was deposited in the United States mail or placed in 
Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered to: 
BRYAN J PATTISON 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
192 E 200 N 3RD FLR 
ST GEORGE UT 84770 
JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN 
ASCIONE HEIDEMAN & MCKAY LLC 
2696 N UNIVERSITY AVE STE 180 
PROVO UT 8 4 604 
RICHARD RANNEY 
RANNEY & PEATROSS 
PO BOX 1662 
ST GEORGE UT 84771-1662 
Dated this November 15, 2007. 
Deputy/(5^erk / 
Case No. 20070779 
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Washington City; 10 unknown 
persons working for or under 
the authority of Washington 
City, Inc.; and John Does I-
XII, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Steve Woods and Allison Woods, 
Intervenors and Appellants. 
PY _^uadDRAHJW»4-BECISION 
CNot For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20070779-CA 
F I L E D 
(December 20, 2007) 
2007 UT App 398 
Fifth District, St. George Department, 040500378 
The Honorable James L. Shumate 
Attorneys: Justin D. Heideman and Richard Ranney, St. George, 
for Appellants 
Bryan J. Pattison and Jeffrey N. Starkey, St. George, 
for Appellees 
Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and Davis. 
PER CURIAM: 
Steve and Allison Woods (the Woodses) appeal the trial 
court's order denying their motion for joinder. This is before 
the court on its own motion for summary disposition on the 
grounds that the notice of appeal was not timely filed. 
The trial court entered its order denying joinder on August 
6, 2007. The Woodses filed their notice of appeal with the 
district court on September 21, 2007, forty-six days after the 
entry of the order appealed. 
Pursuant to rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days of the entry 
of the order or judgment appealed. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a) . 
The Woodses filed their notice of appeal more than thirty days 
after the entry of the order denying joinder, and is thus 
untimely. If an appeal is not timely filed, this court lacks 
jurisdiction to consider the appeal and must dismiss it. See 
Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth,, 2000 UT App 299, ^ 7, 13 P.3d 616. 
The Woodses assert that their notice of appeal was timely 
filed because they filed a motion for reconsideration that tolled 
the time for filing their notice of appeal. However, the Utah 
Supreme Court has ruled that motions to reconsider are not 
recognized by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and do not toll 
the time for filing a notice of appeal. See Gillett v. Price, 
2006 UT 24, ^ 7, 135 P.3d 861. Therefore, the time for appeal 
ran from the order entered on August 6, 2007. 
Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, ^ — 
Associate Presiding Judge 
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FIRE-FLOW REQUIREMENTS FOR BUILDINGS 
(See UFC Section 903.3) 
ECTION 1 — SCOPE 
he procedure determining fire-flow requirements for buildings 
r portions of buildings hereafter constructed shall be in accord-
ace with Appendix III-A. Appendix III-A does not apply to struc-
lres other than buildings. 
ACTION 2 — DEFINITIONS 
or the purpose of Appendix III-A, certain terms are defined as 
ollows: 
FIRE AREA is the floor area, in square feet, used to determine 
he required fire flow. 
FIRE FLOW is the flow rate of a water supply, measured at 20 
>si (137.9 kPa) residual pressure, that is available for firefighting. 
SECTION 3 — MODIFICATIONS 
J.l Decreases. Fire-flow requirements may be modified down-
ward by the chief for isolated buildings or a group of buildings in 
ural areas or small communities where the development of full 
Ire-flow requirements is impractical. 
3.2 Increases. Fire flow may be modified upward by the chief 
where conditions indicate an unusual susceptibility to group fires 
or conflagrations. An upward modification shall not be more than 
twice that required for the building under consideration. 
SECTION 4 — FIRE AREA 
4.1 General. The fire area shall be the total floor area of all floor 
levels within the exterior walls, and under the horizontal projec-
tions of the roof of a building, except as modified in Section 4. 
4.2 Area Separation. Portions of buildings which are separated 
by one or more four-hour area separation walls constructed in ac-
cordance with the Building Code, without openings and provided 
with a 30-inch (762 mm) parapet, are allowed to be considered as 
separate fire areas. 
4.3 Type I and Type II-F.R. Construction. The fire area of 
buildings constructed of Type I and Type II-F.R. construction shall 
be the area of the three largest successive floors. 
SECTION 5 — FIRE-FLOW REQUIREMENTS FOR 
BUILDINGS 
5.1 One- and Two-Family Dwellings. The minimum fire flow 
and flow duration requirements for one- and two-family dwellings 
having a fire area which does not exceed 3,600 square feet (344.5 
m2) shall be 1,000 gallons per minute (3785.4 L/min.). Fire flow 
and flow duration for dwellings having a fire area in excess of 
3,600 square feet (344.5 m2) shall not be less than that specified in 
Table A-III-A-1. 
EXCEPTION: A reduction in required fire flow of 50 percent, as 
approved, is allowed when the building is provided with an approved 
automatic sprinkler system. 
5.2 Buildings other than One- and Two-Family Dwell-
ings. The minimum fire flow and flow duration for buildings oth-
er than one- and two-family dwellings shall be as specified in 
Table A-III-A-1. 
EXCEPTION: A reduction in required fire flow of up to 75 per-
cent, as approved, is allowed when the building is provided with an ap-
proved automatic sprinkler system The resulting fire flow shall not be 
less than 1,500 gallons per minute (5677.5 L/min.). 
• i_Qni 
TABLE A-III-A-1—MINIMUM REQUIRED FIRE FLOW AND FLOW DURATION FOR BUILDINGS 
FIRE AREA (square feet) 















































































































































































1Types of construction are based upon the Building Code. 
2Measured at 20 psi (137.9 kPa). See Appendix III-A, Section 2. 
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APPENDIX lll-B 
FIRE HYDRANT LOCATIONS AND DISTRIBUTION 
(See UFC Section 903.4.2) 
SECTION 1 — SCOPE 
Fire hydrants shall be provided in accordance with Appendix 
[II-B for the protection of buildings, or portions of buildings, here-
after constructed. 
SECTION 2 — LOCATION 
Fire hydrants shall be provided along required fire apparatus ac-
cess roads and adjacent public streets. 
SECTION 3 — NUMBER OF FIRE HYDRANTS 
The minimum number of fire hydrants available to a building shall 
not be less than that listed in Table A-III-B-1. The number of fire 
hydrants available to a complex or subdivision shall not be less 
than that determined by spacing requirements listed in Table 
A-III-B-1 when applied to fire apparatus access roads and perime-
ter public streets from which fire operations could be conducted. 
SECTION 4 — CONSIDERATION OF EXISTING FIRE 
HYDRANTS 
Existing fire hydrants on public streets are allowed to be consid-
ered as available. Existing fire hydrants on adjacent properties 
shall not be considered available unless fire apparatus access 
roads extend between properties and easements are established to 
prevent obstruction of such roads. 
SECTION 5 — DISTRIBUTION OF FIRE HYDRANTS 
The average spacing between fire hydrants shall not exceed that 
listed in Table A-III-B-1. 
EXCEPTION: The chief may accept a deficiency of up to 10 per-
cent where existing fire hydrants provide all or a portion of the required 
fire hydrant service. 
Regardless of the average spacing, fire hydrants shall be located 
such that all points on streets and access roads adjacent to a build-
ing are within the distances listed in Table A-III-B-1. 
TABLE A-III-B-1—NUMBER AND DISTRIBUTION OF FIRE HYDRANTS 
I FIRE-FLOW REQUIREMENT (gpm) 
I x 3.785 for L/min. 









7,500 or more 










8 or more5 
AVERAGE SPACING BETWEEN 
HYDRANTS1'23 (feet) 
MAXIMUM DISTANCE FROM 
ANY POINT ON STREET OR ROAD 
FRONTAGE TO A HYDRANT4 





















deduce by 100 feet (30 480 mm) for dead-end streets or roads. 
2Where streets are provided with median dividers which can be crossed by firefighters pulling hose lines, or arterial streets are provided with four or more traffic 
lanes and have a traffic count of more than 30,000 vehicles per day, hydrant spacing shall average 500 feet (152.4 m) on each side of the street and be arranged on an 
alternating basis up to a fire-flow requirement of 7,000 gallons per minute (26 495 L/min.) and 400 feet (122 m) for higher fire-flow requirements. 
3Where new water mains are extended along streets where hydrants are not needed for protection of structures or similar fire problems, fire hydrants shall be pro-
vided at spacing not to exceed 1,000 feet (305 m) to provide for transportation hazards. 
4Reduce by 50 feet (15 240 mm) for dead-end streets or roads. 
5One hydrant for each 1,000 gallons per minute (3785 L/min.) or fraction thereof. 
